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THE SPECTACULARIZATION OF
SUBJECTIVITY:
MEDIA KNOWLEDGES,
GLOBAL CITIZENRY,
AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

Rhonda Hammer & Peter McLaren
The actants, those structures of narrative action, had to
sustain the drama of masculine words and deeds for the
most ethereal and most lusted-after of goals-to be seen by
all not to have backed down, to have drawn the line in the
sand and made the inscription matter. The sands tum to
concrete when the manly write in them. These are old,
indeed old-fashioned, tendentious, unscrupulously
generalizing feminist remarks. They need to be made
again, as long as virtu, the quality of manliness, means
the readiness to kill, that is, to be a replicant, of whatever
biological or technological description, in the reproductive
dramas of the Father, who forever structures the action in
order to produce, again and again, the sacred image of the
same. In saecula saeculorum. And, ageless, Bush and
Saddam Hussein, those two secular figure heads of secular
states, each declaring holy war, figured in blinding
mirror image as autocrat and democrat, are surely
knowingly enmeshed in the brotherly salvation histories
that have driven their two Peoples of the Book for centuries.
-Donna Haraway, 1991, pp. 42-43
The subject is constructed through acts of differentiation
that distinguish the subject from its constitutive outside, a
domain of abjected alterity conveniently associated with
the feminine, but clearly and not exclusively so.
Precisely in this recent war we see the Arab as figured as
the abjected Other, a site of homophobic fantasy well made
clear in the abundance of bad jokes grounded in the
linguistic sliding from Saddam to Sodom.
-Judith Butler, 1991, p. 76

46

Polygraph

Postmodern wars are not fought for clearly defined goals.
Combatants may well invoke pretexts, but these pretexts
are subject to change. As goals change, these wars come to
assume an anarchic aspect. Postmodern wars have
opened up multiple discursive spaces in which individuals
can find agency; women who have always been part of war
can find in postmodern war a space to articulate this
participation. This articulation threatens to undermine
the Homeric war myth, yet it is itself always threatened by
the entrenchedness of that archetype. The
disenfranchised who before submitted to the distortions of
dominant discourse are making their voices heard and
their faces seen and thus exposing the mechanisms of
power consolidation.
-Miriam Cooke, 1991, p. 27
The FIAneur in Postmodern Culturel

Our analysis of the media production of the war against Iraq by
CNN and its valorization of the viewer as "phallomilitary
warrior-citizen" (Cooke, 1991; Butler, 1991) follows the
observation by Susan Buck-Morss (1989) that the role of the news
reporter as "flaneur-become detective [who] covers the beat" or
"photojournalist [who] hangs about like a hunter ready to shoot"
has changed as capitalism has expanded into hitherto
uncommodified social and cultural realms and has further
implicated itself in the signifying practices of mass
communication media. We have followed Buck-Morss in tracing
the views of Walter Benjamin towards his figure of the flaneur,
the "street reader" who strolls ambiguously and ambivalently
through the city streets, projecting a "distaste for the industrial
labour through which he glides" (Eagleton, 1981: 26) and
abandoning himself to the crowd like a commodity.
According to Buck-Morss, Benjamin saw the flaneur in
shifting roles, from a "person of leisure (Musse)" to someone
engaged in "loitering (Mussigang)" to the "prototype of the new
form of salaried employee who produces news/ literature/
advertisements for the purpose of information/ entertainment/
persuasion" (p. 306). Buck-Morss paints a final portrait of the
flaneur as someone whom Benjamin felt advertised not simply
commodities but ideological propaganda. Like a "sandwichman"
who is "paid to advertise the attractions of mass culture" (pp. 306307), the flaneur as "journalist-in-uniform" advertises the state
and "profits by peddling the ideological fashion" (p. 307).
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Benjamin's early depiction of the flaneur, who "moves
majestically against that historical grain that would decompose
his body into an alien meaning, reduce his numinous presence to
an allegory of loss" (Eagleton, p. 154) was a socially rebellious
cultural worker, the bohemian prototype-or "ur-form"-of the
modern intellectual (Buck-Morss, p. 304). His method of literary
production rejected the mandarin status of the metropolitan
intellectual and consisted in strolling the city streets and
reflecting on the everyday production of cultural life. As BuckMorss notes, the flaneur's "object of inquiry is modernity itself'
(p. 304).
Our understanding of contemporary forms of electronically
produced media knowledges has been informed by what we
perceive as the changing role of the flaneur in the age of late
capitalism-one that is as ominous and drastic as the changes
which Benjamin perceived. We suggest that the flaneur no longer
provides the service of teaching his or her generation about "their
own objective circumstances;" rather, we suggest that the flaneur,
as global newscaster, has transmogrified into the afterimage of
fascism.
Today we are living in a precarious historical moment in
which the flaneur-as signifying agent-is undergoing even
further metamorphosis. The postmodern flaneurs of today are
corporate individuals cunningly managing and shaping the
world of mass-produced images, superannuated servants of the
state whose forms of knowledge production are mediated by and
fastened securely to the logic of consumption. They still stroll the
city streets, as they did in Benjamin's era, but this time they are
accompanied by a video production crew and, in times of war, a
military censor. Often salaried employees of transnational
corporations and other standard bearers of imperialism, the
global, postmodern flaneurs serve up insights (to audiences
exceeding millions at one viewing) that more often than not
mystify and further camouflage race, class, and gender
antagonisms, and thereby hinder rather than help viewers
understand the conditions of everyday existence.
As reality increasingly becomes confused with the image, and
the mediascape becomes the driving force of our time, the image of
the postmodern flaneur becomes embodied not in human presence
but in human immanence transmuted through an electronic
signal, a satellite beam roaming the earth in search of new
spectacles through which to present and contain reality. We are
entering an age of painful loss of everyday history and shared
popular memory that has followed the development of media
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technology since the beginning of the century (Schwoch, White
and Reilly, in press).
Media knowledges produced by the postmodern flaneur serve as
a discourse about action that teleologically fulfills itself in the
sense that it recounts an event, that is, in the sense that it emplots
an event. Yet, paradoxically, it is an emplotment of a history-an
event--that is manufactured not simply as narrative but also as
mood, as a "structure of feeling." Oft.en it has no real beginning
(arche) or end (telos) other than the illusion created by the context
of its production. The Gordian knot of history is cleaved as
history is declared dead in the frozen moment of the image. For
instance, the bloody aftermath of the war with Iraq continues
today, although the media has officially declared the war to be
over.
Media knowledges offered up by the postmodern flaneur-what
we refer to as "perpetual pedagogy"-constitute a moving,
circulating signwork that possesses a valorizing and
legitimating function in the way that it marks off the territory of
the real. In the case of the Gulf War, it was able to situate the
mobile self of postmodernity in a synecdochial relation to a
hyperreal, apocalyptic event, one that came ideologically
unannounced yet was able to "cue" both our sign membership and
our "affective investment" (Grossberg, 1988) into the political
economy of patriotism and global citizenry.

Profane Illumination: Entertainment as the Structuring of
Colonialist Modes of Subjectivity
Our previous investigations of the media (Hammer and
Wilden, 1987; Giroux and McLaren, in press; 1991; Hammer and
McLaren, in press; McLaren and Hammer, 1991) did little to
prepare us for the violent semiotics of the media spectacle
surrounding the coverage of the Gulf War, especially the way it
was able to meld the apocalyptic genre of catastrophe with the
nonsense genre of carnival. More specifically, we were struck by
the ability of the media to transform the military campaigns in
Kuwait and Iraq into a 24-hour advertising spectacle in which the
newscaster as postmodern flaneur was reduced to a carnival
huckster for patriotic zeal and a salesperson for machineries of
destruction and death.
The propagandistic construction of the Gulf War is an extreme
example of how the media serves up death for surplus consumption
in a politics that centers primarily around the lifestyle industry
and what Stuart Ewen (1988: 264) has termed "info-tainment." As
Ewen (p. 265) notes, "in the ratings game, the news-out of
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economic necessity-must be transformed into a drama, a
thriller, entertainment. Within such a context, the truth is
defined as that which sells" (emphasis original). Especially with
reference to the CNN coverage of the war, a kindred range of
films and videos dealing with war at a distance (Top Gun, Iron
Eagle, etc.) tacitly co-ordinated the reception of many viewers to
the aerial shots of 'precision' hits through a superimposition of
images and forms of emplotment-memories from postmodern
war's electronic and celluloid Hollywood archive-transforming
the war coverage into a type of palimpsest blending the
discontinuity of war with the continuity of Western narratives
about it.
The mass production of patriotic sentiment and the mobilization
of consent that allowed such a disproportionate and excessive use
of force to literally disintegrate hundreds of thousands of Iraqi
soldiers fleeing north out of Kuwait (described as "one of the most
terrible harassments of a retreating army in the history of
warfare;" Ellis, Saeeda and Plott, 1991) was, in our minds,
unquestionably designed as a mass advertisement; the hidden
payoff was not the construction of a more critically informed
public but rather an electronic display for showcasing weapons of
mass destruction in a way that benefitted the arms dealers, the
war industry, and a phallic warfare state deploying identities
politically and strategically by preparing its citizenry to assume a
leadership role in a "new world order."
Can we tell the difference between actual and simulated war? It
is difficult when the investigative gaze of the viewer is replaced by
a giddy acquiescence to the accredited expertise of visiting
military experts and politicians. This is not to suggest that there
exists no readings among viewers that aggravate the technoideological thrust of the programming but rather that the static and
retrospective character of news shows is often enough to smudge
the boundary between doxa and episteme. Spectacles do not invite
situating information into a context. This was most evident in
CNN's use of dazzling optical effects as exploding bombs and
tracer bullets became luminously pock-marked against darkened
skies while the Iraqi soldiers remained largely invisible except
perhaps as oneiric battlefield abstractions that resembled the
ovaloid forms of Oliver Wascow photographs.
The "totally administered stylistic environment" of the
newscast is one of the best entertainment formats for
promulgating "cognitive confusion" and geopolitical
misunderstanding. Ewen (1988: 265) remarks:
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The highly stylized signature of the news program offers
the only overarching principle of cohesion and meaning.
Again, surface makes more sense than substance. The
assembled facts, as joined together by the familiar,
formulaic, and authoritative personality of "The News,"
becomes the most accessible version of the larger reality
that most Americans have at their disposal.
Consciousness about the world is continually drawn away
from a geopolitical understanding of events as they take
place in the world. As nations and people are daily sorted
out into boxes marked "good guys," "villains," "victims,"
and "lucky ones," style becomes the essence, reality
becomes appearance.
Investment in imperialism is important for the United States in
order to retain its superpower status since it cannot compete
successfully with Japan and Germany's demilitarized
economies. We view the war coverage on CNN and other stations
as a global media advertising campaign for sophisticated
weapons technology- technology now being sold to countries
inhabiting the Gulf region and elsewhere (i.e., Israel and
Turkey). The Gulf War spectacle, in this sense, reflected the
global push of transnational capital in the information-cultural
sphere primarily through the transformation of the "theater" of
battle into an international market economy. It was an
advertisement for the "new world order" of Western-structured
development and incorporation into the dominant world business
order. Yet the kind of new world order to which the Gulf War
pointed was framed by a gaudy sideshow of flags, emblems, and
military hardware-a counterfeit democracy produced through
media knowledges able to effectively harness the affective
currency of popular culture such that the average American's
investment in being "American" reached an unparalleled high
which has not been approximated since the years surrounding the
post-WWII McCarthy hearings.
Doublespeak: the New Language of Democracy
The success of the advertising campaign surrounding both the
"selling" and the "displaying" of the Gulf War was largely due to
the strategic use of doublespeak to disguise from television
viewers the extent of the real terror and carnage of the military
campaign against Iraq. When a euphemism is used to mislead or
deceive, it becomes doublespeak. William Lutz (1981: 1) writes
that doublespeak
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is a language that avoids or shifts responsibility,
language that is at variance with its real or purported
meaning. It is a language that conceals or prevents
thought; rather than extending thought, doublespeak limits
it.
For instance, Lutz reports that in 1984 the US State Department
announced it would no longer use the word "killing" in its annual
report on the status of human rights in countries around the world.
Instead, it chose to employ the term "unlawful or arbitrary
deprivation of life." While the State Department claimed that this
was a more accurate description of the condition, the term actually
functioned to direct attention away from the embarrassing
situation of government-sanctioned killings in countries
supported by the United States and who have been certified by the
United States as respecting the human rights of its citizens (p. 3).
"Radiation enhancement device" is a term that has been used by
Pentagon officials to nuclear bombs. The neutron bomb was
called a "cookie cutter" because it could kill people inside less
than a three-quarter-mile radius without harming allied soldiers
and civilians nearby.
Doublespeak occurs through the use of terms that are to a large
extent technically true but which serve to function as a lie. For
instance, a profit may be described as a "negative deficit;"
euphemisms for firing staff may be described as "staff reduction,"
"non-retention," "dehiring," or "rationalizing of resources."
During the media's production of the Gulf War, there existed, in
the words of Carol E. Cohn (1991: 88), a "reversal of metaphors
between sentient beings and insentient things." For example, the
term "air support" overlooks the devastation and loss of life
during bombing raids; "collateral damage" refers to civilian
deaths; "incontinent ordinances" are bombs or missiles that hit
allied troops under conditions of "friendly fire"; a "party" is a
battle; "bags of tools" refers to weapons; "theater of operations" to a
battlefield; "surgical strike" refers to precision bombing; and
"delivering a package" to dropping bombs.
Cohn (p. 88) describes a radio news briefing on the Persian Gulf
as "Madison Avenue's idea of a housewife's dream: General
Colin Powell talks about fighting in a "sanitary fashion." The
air force launches "surgically clean strikes." Instead of bombing
the Iraqi troops, US forces are "flying sorties," "engaging" the
enemy, "taking out" Iraqi "assets," "servicing" targets, and
"softening up" the Republican Guard. Iraqi soldiers do not blow
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up when they are hit by bombs or missiles. Instead, their
"emplacements absorb the munitions" (p. 88). Human beings
become insentient things while weapons become the living actors
of war. "Smart" weapons that have eyes and computer "brains"
make the decision when and where to drop seven and a half tons of
bombs, taking away the moral responsibility of the combatants
themselves (p. 88).
CNN's spectacularization of the Gulf War managed to position
the viewer so that to be against it was to be 'biased' and to be in
favor of it was to be 'objective.' Its narrative apparatus with its
apparent realism, or representionality, not only restructured our
feelings surrounding the historical conditions being played out
but through strategies of indirection and disinformation was also
able to mobilize particular economies of affect. Again, our
argument is that the war could be read as one large advertisement
that served as unquestionably the "best show in town." Just as sure
as US bombs obliterated Iraqi soldiers and civilians, the media's
war obliterated the particular historical and political background
of Western imperialism that served as the context for the actual
:fighting. In the words reminiscent of an advertisement, Richard
Blystone of CNN (1/2/91) described a "Scud" missile as "a
quarter-ton of concentrated hatred" while the Patriot missile was
described by USA Today (1/22/91) as "three inches longer than a
Cadillac Sedan de Ville" (Naureckas, 1991 ).
It is ironic if not profoundly disturbing that the substanceless
unreality of the Gulf War-its hyperreality-has become the
metanarrative for a renewed US patriotism and the meaning of
citizenship. The construction of patriotism through the production
of media unreality works-has meaning-as long as the viewer
does not know his or her desire is being mobilized and structured
through the advertisement mode of information. According to
Mark Poster (1990: 63):
As ad after ad is viewed, the representational critical
gradually loses interest, becomes lulled into a noncritical
stance, is bored, and gradually receives the
communication differently ... the ad only works to the
extent that it is not understood to be an ad, not understood
instrumentally. Through its linguistic structure the TV
ad communicates at a level other than the instrumental
which is placed in brackets. Floating signifiers, which
have no relation to the product, are set in play; images and
words that convey desirable or undesirable states of being
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are portrayed in a manner that optimizes the viewer's
attention without arousing critical awareness.
A communication is enacted, in the TV ad, which is not
found in any context of daily life. An unreal is made real,
a set of meanings is communicated which is more real
than reality.

The Mass Spectacle as Totemic Advertisement
Perhaps the most important point to be made about the
construction of subjectivity through media as a form of
advertisement is its religious function. As Sut Jhally (1990: 202)
has noted in his historical tracing of the person-object relation in
advertisements, advertisements now function as a form of
totemism in which "utility, symbolization and personalization
are mixed and remixed under the sign of the group." Products no
longer become venerated for their utility, their value as icons, or
their power as fetishes; rather, they now serve in the post-Fordist
service economy as a badge of a group-a form of shared lifestyle.
New world order patriots are now held together by lifestyle rather
than particular political commitments. For example, Arnold
Schwarzenegger recently purchased a special jeep (nicknamed
the "Hummer") used in the Gulf War by US troops for his own
personal use. In New York City, manufacturers of bullet proof
vests are starting special fashion lines for toddlers and
elementary school children who might accidently absorb stray
bullets from homeboy dealers in pumps, ten-dollar gold tooth caps
and who carry customized AK 4 7 assault rifles. The guns are not
lifestyle accessories-yet. But gas masks are. New York
celebrity fashion designer, Andre Van Pier, has recently
announced a new Spring fashion line based on the theme of
"Desert Storm." It attempts to capture the "Gulf War look."
Fashion accessories revealed include neon-colored gas masks
slung renegade-chic over the shoulder. To add insult to injury, a
major New York baseball card manufacturer has revealed a new
line of Gulf War cards that are supposed to be "educational." Of
course, the cards include photos of all the major US war hardware
and portraits of the American Generals, but the only item
represented from Iraq in this 'educational' collection is a "Scud"
missile.
The Gulf War was packaged for US viewers in the form of the
lifestyle politics of watching football spectacles. According to
Ernest Larsen (1991: 5), following the Gulf War Superbowl,
January, 1991, "General Schwarzkopf explain[ed] the fine points
of bombing runs, with the same delivery style and the same
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instant replay as the network football commentators have just
used." Further, he notes that the idiom used on television to
describe the war
also evoked the jingoist jocksniffery of football
announcers. The emphasis on number, names, and stats,
on graphics, plays, and kicking ass, and later, on "cutting
it off and killing it," in Colin Powell's unstudied phrase,
are all derived from the sports world, that sweaty utopia of
repressed homoerotic ritual combat made up of grown-up
males in uniforms whose entire livelihood is concentrated
on their ability to use their fetishized bodies with the
forceful precision of high-tech weapons. At one point Bush
even called the war his Super Bowl. (p. 8)

Television Reality as the Discourse of the Other
Soon after the war ended, our students (both from our respective
classrooms in Canada and the United States) began to express
regret that they could no longer return to their television sets with
the same mixture of commitment and enjoyment that many of
them confided they reserved only for their favorite soap operas.
CNN's staged desire in its coverage of the war had presented them
with unambiguous co-ordinates to construct national economies of
affect in the form of binary oppositions (patriot/traitor; good/evil;
Christian/Muslim; democracy/dictatorship; liberators/enslaved). Hussein was compared to other dark-skinned leaders such
as ldi Amin, Qadafi and Noriega while the only European who
made this rogues gallery was Stalin (Shohat, 1991). As Shohat
points out, television anchors in the US followed George Bush in
calling Hussein by his first name-"Sadd'm"-in order to evoke
a series of associations such as Satan, Damn, and Sodom. How
many television anchors have you heard refer to George Bush as
George? Furthermore, it is interesting to note why Hussein was
never compared to Hitler when he was armed by the US and when
he used chemical weapons against Iranians and Kurds. Why, for
instance, did television archives reveal the brutal consequences
of chemical warfare by using images from WWI or from the
Iran-Iraq war while avoiding any images of destruction caused
by Agent Orange or napalm during Vietnam strikes (Shohat,
1991: 137)? Shohat (1991:37) further notes that
the Hussein-Hitler analogy prolonged the historical
intertext of Israeli and American imagery linking Arabs
to Nazis. This link, both metonymic and metaphoric, had
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been a staple of didactic Israeli films (Hill 24 Doesn't
Answer, Rebels, Against the Light) as well as of
Hollywood cinema (Ship of Fools, Exodus, Raiders of the
Lost Ark).
The use of warring oppositions such as "good/evil" and
"democracy/dictatorship" to frame associations between Hussein
and Hitler served to decontextualize and dehistoricize the events
surrounding the war and to effectively "symmetrize" existing
relations of power and privilege in the Gulf region. For instance,
by establishing chains of equivalences between the war in the Gulf
and WWII, the colonial and neo-colonial legacy of European
nations who "parcelled up" the inhabitants of the Ottoman empire
and installed monarchies and regimes loyal to the imperial
powers was successfully elided. This made it easier for typical
colonial narratives to be constructed such as "the rescue of white or
dark women from a dark rapist" under the metaphor, "the rape of
Kuwait," which followed the "historical oversexualization of
Blacks and Indians ... [which was continued]...in the image of
Saddam and the Arabs" (Shohat, p. 140).
The colonial narratives played out for American viewers
during CNN's production of the Gulf War echoed the way in which
contemporary forms of media knowledges reproduce national
images of citizenship such as those modelled on the JohnWayneing of America and captured in the renumerative cliches,
"Go for it!" and "Go ahead. Make my day!" Rocky Balboa's "Go
for it!" (which has become the clarion call for the US brand of
rugged individualism) and Clint Eastwood's "Go ahead. Make
my day!" adorn the discursive fountainhead of United States
bravado culture. These slogans have become cultural aphorisms
that reveal a great deal about the structural unconscious of the
United States. Both Ronald Reagan and George Bush have
referred to "Go ahead. Make my day!" during their time in office.
When Clint Eastwood delivered his famous lines in the movie,
Sudden Impact (made during the Reagan presidency), he is
daring a Black man to murder a woman so that he (Dirty Harry)
can kill him. As Michael Rogin (1990) has pointed out, Dirty
Harry is willing to sacrifice women and people of color in the
name of his own courage. Reagan had made women and Black
people his targets by destroying their welfare-state tax benefitsan act he was defending when he dared his detractors to "Make
my day!" Similarly, George Bush made the Black criminal and
white rapist of Sudden Impact into the figure of Willie Horton, as
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he attempted for the first time to organize American politics
around the ominous image of interracial rape (Rogin, 1990).
With the upcoming 1992 election campaign in mind, Bush
appears to be using the issue of racial hiring quotas in order to
achieve a similar effect-the fear of darker-skinned immigrants
taking away jobs from better qualified white people. And he will
undoubtedly use Gulf War footage to remind Americans that they
are back on top as a world military power and that future threats
from dark-skinned peoples (whether Latinos, AfricanArnericans, or native Americans inside its borders or Arabs or
South Americans outside its borders) will be met with a force as
swift and as deadly as that of Desert Storm.
The coverage of the Gulf War recalled the warning sounded by
the 1975 Trilateral Commission that claimed that the electronic
media were creating situations of surplus democracy that made
the United States more difficult to govern because television was
becoming too adversarial and challenging leadership practices,
policy initiatives, and delegitirnizing established institutions
(Kellner, 1990: pp. 6-7). In the case of the Gulf War, only 1.5
percent of network sources protested the war, about the same
number as the sources who were asked about how the war had
affected their travel plans (Naureckas, 1991: 5). The Brookings
Institute, which was the most important think tank consulted by
the media during the Gulf War, was passed off as a think tank of
the left. Representatives from Brookings were called upon to
debate those from hard-line conservative think tanks such as the
Center for Strategic and International Studies and the American
Enterprise Institute. However, the Brookings Institute has been
"an institution of the center-right for more than a decade" (Soley,
1991: 6). In fact, topping the list of corporate donors to Brookings
were media corporations "which drew heavily on Brookings for
'liberal' opinions and sound bites" (ibid.).
It should come as little surprise that views from an authentic
progressive think tank such as the Institute for Policy Studies
were rarely solicited or cited. In fact, "In seven months of the
conflict, JPS was cited 26 times by six major papers (6 percent of
Brookings' citations); in the first month, not one JPS
representative appeared on a nightly newscast" (Soley, 1991, p. 6).

The New Right and the Deformation of Reality
"And we've now moved what amounts to a medium-size
American city completely capable of defending itself all
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the way over to the Middle East."
-President George Bush
Statement to the press about the US military deployment
in Saudi Arabia, Kennebunkport, Maine, 22 August, 1990,
as cited in 0.K Werckmeister, Citadel Culture, p. 187.
The New Right has used the media effectively (and affectively)
not simply to transform war into a spectacle of national unity
based on the Manichean grandeur of good triumphing over evil;
nor have they used the media primarily to tum generals into talkshow guests through the prodigious use of high-tech image
consultants (although they have done both very successfully; see
Giroux and McLaren, 1989). Even more impressively, the New
Right has been able to seduce Americans through the media to
retreat into cultural nostalgia and social amnesia as a way of
draining attention away from escalating social problems such as
rising incidents of racism in urban settings, growing numbers of
homeless, and the devastation of AIDS. Part of this has to do with
the media's ability to reduce the historical present to a collage of
images, a symbiotic coupling of machine and body, a new cult of
the simulacrum.
Kellner (1990) claims that under the control of multinational
capital, the media have effectively served as ideological
mouthpieces for Reagan/Bush disinformation and in so doing
have helped to forge a conservative ideological hegemony-what
Schiller (1989) calls the "shadowy but many-tentacled
disinformation industry." Kellner writes:
It is a historical irony that the 1980s marked the defeat of
democracy by capitalism in the United States and the
triumph of democracy over state communism in the Soviet
bloc countries. At present, the "free" television media in
the United States are probably no more adversarial and no
less propagandistic than Pravda or the television stations
in the Eastern European countries. Hence the very future
of democracy is at stake-and development of a
democratic communications system is necessary if
democracy is to be realized. (p. 219)
Certainly recent events surrounding the official US media
censorship imposed by the military during the Gulf War has
largely confirmed Kellner's pronouncement. However, the latest
victory of the New Right's media disinformation/propaganda
campaign has been through the invention of and concurrent
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attack upon what has been called the repressive 'left mandarin'
regime of 'political correctness' that is supposedly sweeping North
American university campuses. This so-called movement
embraces every hate-provoking stereotype of every alleged
'radical' imaginable. Educators who work in the public schools
and the universities are currently witnessing a well-orchestrated
and singularly scandalous assault on efforts by progressive
educators to make race, class, and gender issues central to the
curriculum. The new left literacies that have been influenced by
continental social theory, feminist theory and critical social
theory in its many forms (postmodernist, post-colonialist and
post-structuralist, etc.) are being characterized by New Right
critics as a subversion of the political neutrality and ideological
disinterestedness that they claim the enterprise of education
should be all about.
Media Lit.eracy as Count.er-hegemonic Practice
Largely because of the way in which the media function to shape
and merchandize morality and to construct forms of citizenship
and individual and collective identity, our understanding of the
meaning and importance of democracy has become impoverished
in proportion to its dissolution and retreat from contemporary
social life. Today's social ugliness that makes the bizarre appear
normal is no longer just a surrealist fantasy, a proto-surrealist
spin-off, or a Baudrillardean rehearsal for a futureless future.
This scenario is the present historical moment, one that has
arrived in a body bag-unravelled and stomped on by the logic of
the fascist's steel-toed boot. Serial killer Ted Bundy has donated
his multiple texts of identity to our structural unconscious and we
are living them.
Current forms of collective sociality have been brought under
the nouvelle aesthetic sign-form of Madonna's hyper-bra and
Arnold Schwarzenegger's replicant super-cut biceps-part of a
new politics of voyeurism and exhibitionism that celebrates the
culture of commodified flesh over the emancipation of the body
politic. We rehearse our lives under these signs rather than live
them; we become curators and custodians of the detritus produced
by the radical semiurgy that characterizes our current epoch
rather than shapers of a new social vision. We have become
unwanted visitors in the house of technology.
The fantasies of De Sade have become the urban equivalent of
postmodern city life as afiluent neighborhoods of the cyberbourgeoise brush shoulders with the post-holocaust landscape of
ravaged inner cities, creating new forms of envy and disgust.
5.9
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Given the current condition of fin-de-siecle ennui and paranoia,
we have arrived at the zero-degree reality of the kind that once
only graced the pages of surrealist manifestos and punk
fanzines. Andre Breton's "simplest surrealist act"-firing a
pistol into a crowd of strangers-is no longer just a turn-of-thecentury symbolic disruption of the grudgingly mundane or a
symbolic dislocation circulating in avant garde broadsheets. It is
precisely in this current conjuncture that people really are
shooting blindly into crowds: at children in hamburger
establishments, at lunchtime patrons in small town diners, at
employees and employers in factories, at teachers and classmates
in schools, at college administrators, and at female engineering
students in university seminar rooms.
In the nihilistic
extrapolation of the mass produced image as the emergent norm of
postmodern subjectivity, we witness the eclipse of historical
agency and the shrinkage of the democratic imaginary.
In the current historical juncture of democratic decline in the
United States, ideals and images have become detached from their
anchorage in stable and agreed-upon meaning and associations
and are now beginning to assume a reality of their own. The selfreferential world of the media is one that splinters, obliterates,
peripheralizes, partitions and segments social space, time,
knowledge, and subjectivity in order to unify, encompass, entrap,
totalize and homogenize them through the meta-form of
entertainment. What needs to be addressed is the way in which
capitalism is able to secure this cultural and ideological
totalization and homogenization through its ability to insinuate
itself into social practices and private perceptions through various
forms of media knowledges. Questions that need to be asked
include: How are the subjectivities and identities of individuals
and the production of media knowledges within popular culture
mutually articulated? To what extent does the hyperreal
correspond to practices of self and social constitution in
contemporary society? Do we remain "sunk in the depressing
hyperbole of the hyperreal" (Poster, 1990: 66), encysted in the
monologic self-referentiality of the mode of information? Or do
we establish a politics of refusal that is able to contest the tropes that
govern Western colonialist narratives of supremacy and
oppression? What isn't being discussed is the pressing need
within pedagogical sites for creating a media literate citizenry
that can disrupt, contest, and transform media apparatuses so that
they no longer possess the power to infantilize the population and
continue to create passive and paranoid social subjects (McLaren
and Hammer, 1991; Hammer and McLaren, 1991).
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In its unannounced retreat over the past decade, democracy has
managed to recreate power through the spectacularization of its
after-image, that is, through corporatized image management
and the creation of national myths of identity, primarily through
mass media techniques that give democracy an "after-glow" once
it has faded from the horizon of concrete possibility. In other
words, the mandarins of media have created democracy as a
"necessary illusion." Herman and Chomsky (1988: xi) note:
If.... the powerful are able to fix the premises of discourse,
to decide what the general populace is allowed to see, hear,
and think about, and to "manage" public opinion by
regular propaganda campaigns, the standard view of how
the system works is at serious odds with reality.
A critical media literacy recognizes that we inhabit a
photocentric, aural, and televisual culture in which the
proliferation of photographic and electronically produced images
and sounds serves as a form of media catechism-perpetual
pedagogy-through which individuals ritually encode and
evaluate the engagements they make in the various discursive
contexts of everyday life (McLaren, 1986; Giroux and McLaren,
in press; Giroux and McLaren, 1991; McLaren, 1988). It is a form
of literacy that understands media representations-whether
photographs, television, print, film, or another form-as not
merely productive of knowledge but also of subjectivity. John B.
Thompson (1990) has sketched out some elements of the media
literacy we have in mind.
Following Thompson, we suggest that a media literacy must
elucidate the typical modes of appropriation of mass-mediated
products (i.e., the technical media of transmission, the
availability of the skills, capacities and resources required to
decode the messages transmitted by particular media and the
rules, conventions and practical exigencies associated with such
decoding). In other words, how do particular individuals
throughout the course of their everyday existence receive
ritualized messages and integrate them on a daily basis (see
McLaren, 1985)? Individuals do not soak up messages as passive
onlookers or "inert sponges," but rather engage in an ongoing
process of interpreting and incorporating such messages. A
critical media literacy must therefore be attentive to the socialhistorical characteristics of contexts of reception and see them as
situated practices. Here Thompson refers to the spatial and
temporal features of reception (in the case of TV, for instance, we
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would be concerned with who watches, for how long, in what
contexts); the relations of power and the distribution of resources
among recipients; the social institutions within which
individuals appropriate mediated knowledges; as well as the
systematic asymmetries and differentials that characterize the
contexts of reception.
A critical media literacy must also relate the everyday
understanding of media messages to social-historical
characteristics (i.e., race, class, and gender characteristics). It
must analyze how mediated messages are discursively elaborated
as individuals reject or incorporate them as part of their everyday
social practices. And finally, a critical media literacy needs to
explore how the appropriation of mediated messages creates
virtual communities of recipients that are extended across time
and space. Such a media literacy seeks to move beyond Eco's
suggestion of creating a "semiological guerrilla movement"
based on an anarchistic individualism in which each recipient of
mediated messages interprets the transmitted multiplicity of
images whichever way he or she chooses (Kearney, 1988). Rather,
the critical media literacy that we envision seeks to create
communities of resistance, counter-public spheres, and
oppositional pedagogies that can resist dominant forms of
meaning by offering new channels of communication, circuits of
semiotic production, codifications of experience, and perspectives
of reception which unmask the political linkage between images,
their means of production and reception, and the social practices
they legitimate.
However, the credibility of our critical pedagogy of media
literacy is handicapped by a formidable paradox: within certain
academic and pedagogical circles, the very recognition of media
as powerful hegemonic apparatuses impairs the validity of doing
media studies in that those who critique television and other
media apparatuses are often seen as complicitous with those very
structures of domination that they seek to contest. In addition to
constructing a model of media power that speaks to the legitimacy
of engaging in a cultural studies approach, a critical media
literacy needs to addresses sufficiently the specificity and partial
autonomy of media discourses, that is, a model that "would
analyze how the media produce identities, role models, and
ideals; how they create new forms of discourse and experience;
how they define situations, set agendas, and filter out oppositional
ideas; and how they set limits and boundaries beyond which
political discourse is not allowed" (Kellner, 1990: 18).
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Of serious concern in our own work is how electronic prophets
who manufacture personalities and manage person images have
been able to tum wimp Presidents into wrathful avengers and a
frustrated and self-hating citizenry into phallomilitary warrior
citizens who are currently being conditioned to re-direct a mediainstilled hatred of "Sad'am" against a familiar enemy within its
own ranks: the poor, the homeless, people of color, those who
comprise the detritus of capitalism and white man's democracy,
those who are already oppressed by race, gender, caste, and
circumstance. After all, what is the mission of postmodern media
if not the attempt to "Americanize the un-American through
particular forms of cultural assertion linked to capital and
patterns of consumption but also on a grander scale to
interlocking international networks of finance and
surveillance.
Needed is a counter-hegemonic media literacy in which
subjectivities may be lived and analyzed outside the dominant
regime of official print culture-a culture that is informed by a
technophobic retreat from emerging techno-aesthetic cultures of
photography, film, and electronically mediated messages.
Different media knowledges manage to reveal in different ways
what is at stake in naming ourselves as gendered, sexual, and
desiring body/subjects. Not only would a critical media literacy
warn us of the dangers in constructing social practices that
enforce misogynous, homophobic, and patriarchal acts of
naming, it would also construct the grounds for a transformative
and emancipatory politics of difference (McLaren, forthcoming).
Much of this work necessarily involves not only understanding
the disabling and emancipatory potential of the media
knowledges that are available to us, but also the importance of
struggling to overturn current arrangements of extracommunicational forms of power and the social relations that
undergird-and in some instances help to overdetermine-the
production of such knowledges. In this regard, a critical
pedagogy of media literacy seeks to produce partial, contingent,
but necessary historical truths that will provide some of the
necessary conditions for the emancipation of the many public
spheres that make up our social and institutional life, truths
which-unlike those created and sponsored by the mediarecognize their social constructedness and historicity and the
institutional and social arrangements that they help to legitimate.
While the development of a critical media literacy is an
important condition for an emancipatory politics, it is not the sole
enabling condition or productive agent for transforming history.
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Yet it may take us one step further in recuperating the critical
sensibility that Benjamin's flaneur might have once possessed.
NOTE
tThis section is a further development of Giroux and McLaren,
"Introduction" to Media Knowledges by Schwoch, White and
Reilley, op. cit.
REFERENCES
Buck-Morss, Susan. (1989). The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter
Benjamin and the Arcades Project. Cambridge, Mass.: The
MIT Press.
Butler, Judith. (1991). "The Imperialist Subject." Journal of
Urban and Cultural Studres, vol 2, no. l, pp. 73-78.
Cohn, Carole E. (1991). "Decoding Military Doublespeak." Ms.,
vol. 1, no. 5 (May 28), pp. 88.
Cooke, Miriam. (1991). "Phallomilitary Spectacles in the DTO."
Journal of Urban and Cultural Studies, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 27-40.
Ellis, Caroline, Khauun, Saeeda, and Plott, Steve. (1991). "Highway to Hell." New Statesman and Society (June 21), pp. 21-28.
Ewen, Stuart. (1988). All Consuming Images. New York: Basic
Books.
Gerbner, George. (1989/90). "Media Literacy: TV vs. Reality."
Adbusters, vol. 1, no. 2, p. 12.
Gitlin, Todd. (1986). "We Build Excitement." In Todd Gitlin,
(Ed.) Watching Television. New York: Pantheon Books.
Giroux, Henry, and McLaren, Peter. (in press). "Media
Hegemony." Introduction to Media Knowledge by James
Schwoch, Mimi White, and Susan Reilly. Albany, New York:
State University of New York Press.
Giroux, Henry, and McLaren, Peter. (1991). "Leon Golub's
Radical Pessimism: Toward a Pedagogy of Representation."
Exposure, vol. 28, no. 12, pp.18-33.
Giroux, Henry, and McLaren, Peter. "Introduction." In Henry
Giroux and Peter McLaren (Eds.) Critical Pedagogy, the State,
and Cultural Struggle. Albany, New York: State University of
New York Press.
Grossberg, Larry. (1988). It's a Sin. Sydney, Australia: Power
Publications.
Hammer, Rhonda, and McLaren, Peter (in press). "Le Paradoxe
de L'Image: Connaissance Mediatique et Declin de la Qualite
de La Vie." Anthropologie et Societies, special issue, "Pouvoir
des Images."
64

Polygraph

Hammer, Rhonda, and McLaren, Peter. (1991). "Rethinking the
Dialectic." Educational Theory, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 23-46.
Hammer, Rhonda, and Wilden, Anthony. (1987). "Women in
Production: The Chorus Line 1932-1980." In Anthony Wilden,
The Rules are No Game. London and New York: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, pp. 283-300.
Haraway, Donna. (1991). "On Wimps." Journal of Urban and
Cultural Studi,es, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 41-44.
Herman, Edward S. and Chomsky, Noam. (1988). Manufacturing Consent. New York: Pantheon Books.
Jhally, Sut. (1990). The Codes of Advertising. London and New
York: Routledge.
Kearney, Richard. (1988). The Wake of Imagination. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Kellner, Doug. (1990). Television and the Crisis of Democracy.
Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press.
Laren, Ernest. (1991). "Gulf War TV." Jump Cut, no. 36, pp. 3-10.
Lutz, William. (1989). Doublespeak. New York: Harper Collins
Publishers.
McLaren, Peter. (forthcoming). Radical Pedagogy: Postcolonial
Politics in a Postmodern World. London and New York:
Routledge.
t
McLaren, Peter. (1986). Schooling as a Ritual Performance:
Towards a Political Economy of Educational Symbols and
Gestures. London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
McLaren, Peter. (in press). "Introduction." In Peter McLaren
(Ed.) Postmodernism, Postcolonialism, and Pedagogy. Albert
Park: Australia: James Nicholas Publishers, Ltd.
McLaren, Peter. (1988). "Critical Pedagogy and the Politics of
Literacy." The Harvard Educational Review, vol. 58, no. 2, pp.
213-234.
McLaren, Peter. (1985). "Contemporary Ritual Studies: A PostTurnerian Perspective." Semiotic Inquiry, vol 5, no. 1, pp.
78-85.
McLaren, Peter and Hammer, Rhonda. (1989). "Critical
Pedagogy and the Postmodern Challenge: Towards a Critical
Postmodernist Pedagogy of Liberation." Educational
Foundations, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 29-62.
Miller, Crispin Mark. (1989). Boxed In: The Culture of TV.
Evanston, IL.: Northwestern University Press.
Naureckas, Jim. (1991). "Gulf War Courage: The Worst Censorship Was At Home." Extra!, vol. 4, no. 3(May,1991), pp. 3-10.
Poster, Mark. (1990). The Mode of Information. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press.
65

Hammer & McLaren
Rogin, Michael. (1990). "'Make My Day!': Spectacle as Amnesia
in Imperial Politics." Representations, vol. 29, pp. 99-123.
Schwoch, James, White, Mimi, and Reilly, Susan. (in press).
Media Knowledge. Albany, New York: State University of
New York Press.
Schiller, Herbert I. (1989). Culture, Inc.: The Corporate Takeover
of Public Expression. New York and Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Shohat, Ella. (1991). "The Media's War." Social Text, vol. 9, no.
3, pp. 135-141.
Soley, Laurence. (1991). "Brookings: Stand-In for the Left."
Extra!, vol. 4, no. 3 (May, 1991), p. 6.
Thompson, John B. Ideology and Modern Culture. Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press.
Werckmeister, O.K (1991). Citadel Culture. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press.
Wilden, Anthony. (1987). The Rules are No Game. London and
New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Zizek, Slavoj. (1991). Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques
Lacan Through Popular Culture. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT
Press.

66

